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Abstract—An announcement scheme is a system that facilitates
vehicles to broadcast road-related information in vehicular ad
hoc networks (VANETs) in order to improve road safety and
efficiency. In this paper, we propose a privacy-aware reputation-
based announcement scheme that provides message reliability
evaluation, auditability, and robustness.
I. INTRODUCTION
We call a system that facilitates vehicles to exchange
messages about vehicle, road, and traffic conditions in a
vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) an announcement scheme.
If messages exchanged are reliable (reflecting reality) then
the driving environment may become safer and more efficient.
Unreliable messages, possibly due to hardware malfunction or
driver malicious intention, may result in various consequences
from journey delay to accident. Hence, an announcement
should have the following functionalities: 1) message relia-
bility evaluation – vehicles should be able to evaluate the
reliability of messages received, and 2) auditability – vehicles
that broadcast unreliable messages should be identified and
revoked. In addition, an announcement scheme should satisfy
the following security requirements: 3) robustness – its per-
formance should not be affected by attacks from adversaries,
and 4) privacy awareness – the privacy of vehicles should be
protected, since messages may contain data private to vehicle
users. Vehicle privacy has two facets:
 Anonymity. The identity of a vehicle should not be
revealed from messages broadcast by the vehicle.
 Unlinkability. Multiple messages broadcast by the
same vehicle should not be linked to each other.
Li et al. [13] proposed a reputation-based announcement
scheme that aims to provide message reliability evaluation,
auditability, and robustness. This scheme relies on a centralised
reputation system with an off-line trusted authority. In this
scheme the reliability of a message is evaluated according to
the reputation of the vehicle that generates this message. The
message is considered reliable if the vehicle has a sufficiently
high reputation. The reputation reflects the extent to which
the vehicle has announced reliable messages in the past. It is
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computed and updated based on feedback reported by other
vehicles. The reputation scores of all vehicles are managed by
a trusted central authority. A vehicle periodically retrieves its
reputation certificate, which contains its reputation score, from
the central authority. When a vehicle broadcasts a message it
attaches its reputation certificate to the message, which allows
a receiving vehicle to infer the reliability of the message.
The central authority revokes a vehicle whose reputation score
decreases beyond a threshold by no longer providing a new
reputation certificate.
This approach features the important performance advan-
tage of immediate evaluation: upon receiving a message a
receiving vehicle is able to immediately evaluate its reliability.
This enables the receiving vehicle to respond quickly. In
a scheme that does not support immediate evaluation, such
as [6,7,12,15,18], a receiving vehicle has to wait until sufficient
information is received from other vehicles before the message
reliability can be evaluated accurately. However, the scheme
in [13] overlooks privacy: messages and feedback are link-
able and not anonymous. This drawback may affect vehicles’
willingness to participate.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold: 1) we generalise
the scheme in [13] and propose an abstraction that we will refer
to as the basic scheme, and 2) we provide vehicle privacy for
the basic scheme.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We discuss
related work in Section II. In Section III we describe the
basic scheme. We then elaborate and analyse our privacy-aware
scheme in Section IV. In Section V, we discuss other properties
of our privacy-aware schemes and some related issues. We
conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been a number of announcement schemes
proposed to evaluate the reliability of messages in VANETs.
These can be categorised into two main groups: the threshold
method and the reputation-based method.
A majority of announcement schemes, e.g. [6,7,12,15,18],
use the threshold method: a message is believed reliable if
it has been announced by multiple distinct vehicles whose
number exceeds a threshold within a time interval. This method
is only suitable for messages that can be broadcast by multiple
vehicles. It is not suitable for messages that may be broadcast
by only one vehicle, such as beacons, which contain the
current position, speed, and direction of the broadcasting
vehicle [10]. In addition, this method also gives rise to the
problem of distinguishability of message origin [9] - how to tell
if two messages are made by two distinct vehicles if vehicles
are anonymous and their activities are unlinkable. Solutions
include using a message-linked group signature [18] and one-
time anonymous authentication [17].
In addition to [13] there have been several announce-
ment schemes based on reputation systems, such as [8,14,16].
These schemes adopt a decentralised infrastructure. In [8],
the reliability of a message is gauged by verifying opinions
appended to the message by other vehicles, which may be
a heavy computational burden. In [14], reliability is either
role-based (certain types of vehicles such as traffic patrol are
more trustworthy), majority-based (similar to the threshold
method), or experience-based (trust is established from past
interactions). The scheme of [16] uses current observations
and past behaviour to determine trustworthiness. Both [16] and
the experienced-based scheme may be problematic in a large
VANET environment where vehicles generally do not have
long-term relationships. Storing all this information may also
be a problem. In all these schemes, neither robustness against
collusion of adversaries nor privacy are provided. It is also not
clear how rogue vehicles are revoked.
Compared with existing threshold and reputation-based
schemes, the scheme [13] features: 1) immediate evaluation
of reliability of messages (including beacons), 2) revocation
of malicious vehicles, 3) robustness against both external and
internal adversaries, and 4) a good level of efficiency. However,
the scheme in [13] does not provide privacy protection for
vehicles.
This paper provides a generalisation of the scheme in [13],
based on which we propose a privacy-aware announcement
scheme that additionally provides a good level of privacy
protection for vehicles.
III. THE BASIC SCHEME
In this section, we describe an abstraction of the scheme
in [13] (see Figure 1). This has a centralised architecture with
off-line central authorities. We assume that vehicles are mobile
entities equipped with short-range wireless communication
devices. They: 1) generate and broadcast messages, 2) receive
messages and evaluate their reliability, and 3) report feedback.
There are two logical off-line central authorities: a reputation
server (RS ), and an administrative server (AS ). The RS
computes reputation for vehicles based on feedback reported
by vehicles. The AS : 1) enrols new vehicles and revokes
malicious vehicles, 2) provides vehicles with reputation en-
dorsement, and 3) collects feedback from vehicles. We assume
that the AS has multiple remote wireless communication
interfaces to intermittently communicate with vehicles in a
convenient and frequent manner (for example once a day).
Note that we do not require constant communication between
a vehicle and the AS . We assume that the RS and AS
are trusted, and communication between the RS and AS is
secure (authenticated, confidential, and integrity protected). We
assume that each of the vehicles and the AS has a clock, and
the clock of a vehicle is loosely synchronised with that of the
AS . We also assume that the communication between the AS
and a vehicle, and those between vehicles, are public and thus
subject to attacks.
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Fig. 1. The basic scheme.
A. Protocols and Algorithms Required
This basic scheme requires:
 A secure mutual authentication protocol MEA, which
provides both communicating parties with assurance
of: 1) each other’s identity, and 2) freshness of com-
munication. We denote by MEAfA ! B : mg the
message m sent from A to B after the assurances of
MEA have been established. Vehicles will use MEA
as part of reputation retrieval and feedback reporting.
MEA can be instantiated by any suitable authentication
protocol.
 A secure two-origin authentication protocol TOA. If
A broadcasts a message (m1;m2), TOA provides a
receiver with assurance that: 1) m1 originates from A,
2)m2 originates from a third party C, and 3)m2 is as-
sociated with A. We denote by TOAfA : m1;m2 : Cg
the message (m1;m2) sent by A with the assurances
of TOA provided. Vehicles will use TOA to broadcast
messages. TOA can easily be implemented using, for
example, a digital signature scheme.
 An aggregation algorithm Aggr. The RS will use
it to aggregate feedback and produce reputation for
vehicles.
 A feedback analysis algorithm Detect. The RS will
use it to identify malicious vehicles from feedback.
 A decreasing function TimeDiscount that takes input
a time difference and outputs a value in [0; 1], and
TimeDiscount(0) = 1.
 A threshold 	 in [0; 1], to determine whether a repu-
tation score is sufficiently high.
B. Description of the Basic Scheme
The basic scheme consists of the following protocols:
Scheme initialisation. The scheme is initialised as follows:
1) the AS installsMEA and TOA, generates any keys required;
2) the AS regulates its clock, and deploys its remote wireless
communication interfaces; and 3) the RS creates a database,
and installs Aggr and Detect.
Vehicle registration. The AS registers a new vehicle V as
follows: 1) generates keys to be used by V , 2) installs MEA,
TOA, TimeDiscount in V and securely sends V with 	 and
the keys, and 3) requests RS to create a record in its database
for V .
Reputation retrieval. When a vehicle Vb drives into the
proximity of a wireless communication interface at time, say
t1, it retrieves its reputation credential as follows: 1) Vb and
the AS execute MEA to establish a mutually authenticated
channel; 2) the AS retrieves from RS the reputation r of Vb at
time t1, denoted by (r; Vb; t1); 3) the AS generates a reputation
credential, denoted by f(r; t1) : AS 7! Vbg; and 4) the AS
sends f(r; t1) : AS 7! Vbg to Vb in the mutually authenticated
channel, denoted by MEAfAS ! Vb : f(r; t1) : AS 7! Vbgg.
Message broadcast. At any time, say t2, Vb broadcasts
message m as follows: 1) Vb takes m and f(r; t1) : AS 7! Vbg
as input to generate TOAfVb : m; (r; t1) : ASg, and broadcasts
it; 2) a receiving vehicle Vr verifies it and extracts m, r,
and t1 upon successful verification; 3) Vr retrieves the current
time t2 from its clock and and computes the time-discounted
reputation r0 = r  TimeDiscount(t2   t1); 4) if r0  	, then
Vr considers Vb as reputable and m as reliable; otherwise, Vr
considers Vb as disreputable and m as unreliable.
Feedback reporting. When Vr has experience about the
event described by messagem, it is able to judge the reliability
of m. Then Vr can voluntarily report feedback as follows:
1) Vr assigns a feedback f based on its experience about
the reliability of m; 2) when Vr drives into the proximity of
a wireless communication interface, Vr and the AS execute
MEA to establish a mutually authenticated channel; 3) the
Vr sends f and TOAfVb : m; (r; t1) : ASg to the AS in
the mutually authenticated channel, denoted by MEAfVr !
AS : f;TOAfVb : m; (r; t1) : ASgg; 4) the AS verifies
TOAfVb : m; (r; t1) : ASg; 5) upon successful verification, the
AS sends (f; Vb; Vr) to the RS , who stores it in the database;
6) the RS uses Aggr and all feedback stored in the database
to update the reputation of Vb.
Vehicle revocation. The RS periodically uses Detect on all
feedback stored in the database to identify malicious vehicles,
and reports to the AS . The AS revokes them by no longer
providing them with reputation credentials.
C. Robustness of the Basic Scheme
The robustness of this scheme can be evaluated with respect
to the following attacks: 1) message fraud: an adversary
deceives a vehicle into believing that a false message m0 is
reliable, and 2) reputation manipulation: an adversary unfairly
inflates or deflates the reputation of a vehicle.
We categorise adversaries into two groups: 1) external
adversaries who attack the system without joining as legiti-
mate vehicles, and 2) internal adversaries who are legitimate
vehicles that attack the system.
In order to perpetrate a message fraud attack, an adversary
could: a) impersonate a registered vehicle to retrieve a reputa-
tion credential and then broadcast false messages, or b) forge
a legitimate broadcast message. In order to conduct reputation
manipulation, an adversary could: c) impersonate a registered
vehicle to report feedback. An adversary cannot perform a)-c)
if MEA and TOA are secure and the AS and vehicles manage
their secret keys appropriately.
In addition, an internal adversary can conduct message
fraud by broadcasting a false message itself. This however will
result in a decrease in its reputation, and excessive message
frauds will eventually get itself revoked from the system. An
internal adversary can also conduct reputation manipulation
by providing false feedback itself, either in isolation or in
collusion with other internal adversaries. There are several
approaches to prevent this: 1) proof of spatial proximity: a
receiving vehicle has to prove to the AS its distance from the
sending vehicle when receiving the message, allowing only
neighbouring vehicles (those indeed receive the message from
the sending vehicle) to report feedback; 2) permanent identity:
vehicle identity is permanent, to prevent identity change; 3)
secret key binding: the secret keys of a vehicle are known to
only the vehicle itself, to prevent colluding internal adversaries
from acting on behalf of each other; and 4) data mining:
the AS can analyse received feedbacks to detect malicious
feedback. We do not specify any concrete techniques in this
basic scheme in order to make it inclusive of any possible
techniques (in [13] some instantiations are provided).
D. Privacy Unawareness of the Basic Scheme
However in this basic scheme neither MEA nor TOA pro-
vides anonymity or unlinkability. We now propose a privacy-
aware announcement scheme that realises privacy aware MEA
and TOA.
IV. PRIVACY-AWARE ANNOUNCEMENT SCHEME
In this section we describe our privacy-aware announce-
ment scheme (See Figure 2). We require:
 A secure group signature scheme [1,4,5], denoted
by GS = (GKeyGen; GJoin; GSign; GVerify; Open)
where GKeyGen, GJoin, GSign, GVerify and Open
denote group public key generation, group member
secret key generation, group member signing, group
verification, and signer revealing algorithms, respec-
tively. A group signature scheme has the following
properties: 1) each group member can sign messages;
2) a receiver can verify whether the signature was
signed by a group member, but cannot discover which
group member signed it; 3) any two messages signed
by a group member cannot be linked; and 4) a sig-
nature can be “opened” by a group manager to reveal
the signer of the message.
We will use GS to realise a privacy-aware TOA,
denoted by TOA+ (we will show how TOA+ is
achieved later).
 A secure probabilistic encryption scheme [3,11], de-
noted by PE. This has the property that encryption of
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Fig. 2. Our privacy-aware scheme.
the same plaintext using the same encryption key twice
yields two different ciphertexts which are statistically
indistinguishable. We will use PE to realise a privacy-
awareMEA, denoted byMEA+, by combination of PE
and MEA: MEA+fV ! AS : mg = PEfMEAfV !
AS : mgg.
A. Description of the Privacy-aware Scheme
In this section, we specify the changes that our privacy-
aware scheme makes to the basic scheme:
Scheme Initialisation. In addition to Steps 2 and 3 of
the basic scheme, our privacy-aware scheme requires that:
1) The AS installs GS, MEA+, TimeDiscount, and 	, and
generates keys required. 2) The time is divided into intervals
(T0;T1;T2;    ). For example, each time interval can be one
day. For each interval Ti, the AS uses GKeyGen to generate
a group public key pki and uses GJoin to generate a set of
group member secret keys (sk1i ; sk
2
i ;    ; skni ) where n is the
number of vehicles in the system. A secret key skji will be
used by vehicle Vj during the time interval Ti. Group member
secret keys (skj0; sk
j
1; sk
j
2;    ) will be used by Vj during the
corresponding time intervals (T0;T1;T2;    ). The keys skji
for all i and j are kept confidential for future use.
Vehicle Registration. In addition to Step 3 of the basic
scheme, our privacy-aware scheme requires the AS to: 1)
generate the keys to be used by V for MEA+; and 2) install
MEA+, GSign, GVerify in V , and securely send V with the
keys generated from the previous step and (pk0; pk1; pk2;    ).
Reputation Retrieval. When a vehicle Vb drives into the
proximity of a wireless communication interface during a time
interval Ti, whose beginning time is denoted by ti, it retrieves
its reputation as follows: 1) Vb and the AS execute MEA+
to establish an encrypted and mutually authenticated channel;
2) upon retrieving (r; Vb; ti) from the RS , the AS computes
(r0i; r
0
i+1;    ; r0i+m) until r0i+m+1 < 	 where r0i+k = r 
TimeDiscount(ti+k   ti) (in other words Vb is considered as
reputable for the time intervals Ti;    ;Ti+m); and 3) the AS
sends Vb in the encrypted and mutually authenticated channel
(skbi ;    ; skbi+m).
Message Broadcast. Vb broadcasts a messagem as follows:
1) Vb identifies the current time interval, say Ti, from its clock;
2) Vb uses GSign and skbi , which corresponds to Ti, to generate
a signature  on (m; i), forms a message tuple M = (m; i; ),
and then broadcasts M ; 3) Upon receiving M , a receiving
vehicle Vr immediately identifies the current time interval Tj
from its clock. 4) Vr checks if j = i. If so then Vr uses GVerify
and pki, which corresponds to Ti, to verify . Upon successful
verification, Vr considers Vb to be reputable, and the message
m to be reliable. The message tuple M is stored for future
possible feedback reporting. If j 6= i or the verification fails
then Vr does not consider Vb to be reputable, and discards M .
Feedback reporting. Feedback is reported as follows: 1)
Vr and the AS execute MEA+ to establish an encrypted and
mutually authenticated channel, and Vr sends f;M to the AS
via the channel; 2) the AS uses Open and pki to open M ,
in order to retrieve signer Vb, and sends the RS the tuple
(f; Vb; Vr). The rest remains the same as the basic scheme.
Vehicle Revocation. In our privacy-aware scheme the AS
revokes malicious vehicles by no longer providing them with
new group member secret keys in the future.
In our scheme a reputation credential of Vb at time
interval Ti is represented by a group member secret key:
fr0i : AS 7! Vbg = skbi if r0i  	. TOA+ is realised by
GS: TOA+fVb : m; (r0i  	) : ASg = (m; i; ) where
 = GSignskbi (m; i)). This gives a recipient assurance that
m originated from a reputable (but unidentified) vehicle.
B. Privacy Analysis
In this section we analyse anonymity and unlinkability of
our privacy-aware scheme. We focus on three protocols: rep-
utation retrieval, message broadcast, and feedback reporting,
since only in these protocols does a vehicle transmit data and
thus potentially suffer in a privacy breach.
During reputation retrieval or feedback reporting, since the
channel is protected by MEA+, the anonymity and unlinkabil-
ity of all data sent by a vehicle is protected against all entities
except for the AS . During message broadcast,  is generated
by using a group signature scheme, which protects anonymity
and unlinkability against all entities except for the AS .
C. Robustness of Our Privacy-aware Scheme
Observe that our privacy-aware scheme still features the
same robustness as the basic scheme against adversaries. First,
an adversary is not able to impersonate an existing vehicle (just
as in the basic scheme). In addition, an adversary is also not
able to forge a legitimate broadcast message. This is because
all group member signing keys are transmitted to vehicles via
encrypted channels, and external adversaries are thus unable
to obtain a valid group member secret key. In addition, all
approaches that can be used in the basic scheme to prevent
internal adversaries conducting reputation manipulation can
also be used in our privacy-aware scheme.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Communication and Computational Overheads
In our proposed scheme, the main communication overhead
is the signature . If we use the closely scrutinised Boneh-
Boyen-Shacham (BBS) group signature scheme [4], then  can
be 192 bytes (128 bytes if an additional assumption holds)
with the security level approximately equivalent to 128-byte
RSA signature [4]. The main computational overhead is the
generation and verification of , in which the most expensive
operations are one and two pairing operations, respectively.
One pairing operation takes 3.6ms on an Athlon XP 2 GHz
using code written in C++ [2], meaning that generating and
verifying  takes approximately 3.6ms and 7.2ms, respectively.
With the similar security level, the signatures in [13] take 96
bytes, and signing and verification take 2.1ms and 8.6ms, re-
spectively. Thus, the computational cost is comparable between
the two schemes while the communication cost of our scheme
is greater.
B. Multiple Reputation Levels
Note that our privacy-aware scheme only supports a
binary reputation. It can easily be extended to support
multiple reputation levels with minimal modifications:
Suppose there are m reputation values [	1;	2;    ;	m]
where 	k < 	k+1. During scheme initialisation, the
AS will generate m group public keys for each time
interval Ti, denoted by pki;1;    ; pki;m. The AS will
also generates m sets of group member secret keys
(sk1i;1;    ; skni;1;sk1i;2;    ; skni;2;    sk1i;m;    ; skni;m) for
time interval Ti. During reputation retrieval if a vehicle Vb
has a time-discounted reputation r0i  	k for a time interval
Ti, then Vb will be provided with the group member secret
keys (skbi;k; sk
b
i;k+1;    ; skbi;m). During message broadcast,
Vb uses a group member secret key skbi;k to generate a
signature  on a message m, and form a message tuple
M = (m; i; k; ). A receiving vehicle learns i; k from M , and
uses the group public key pki;k to verify . Upon successful
verification, Vr believes that the reputation of Vb is 	k.
C. Secret Key Retrieval via an Un-encrypted Channel
In our scheme skji has to be transmitted via an encrypted
channel, which imposes a constraint. This can be removed if
we use the BBS scheme [4]. In this scheme a group public key
includes g1, g2, two generators of (multiplicative) cyclic groups
G1, G2 of prime order p, respectively, and g1 =  (g2) for a
computable isomorphism  from G2 to G1. A group member
secret key for member j is (Aj ; xj) where Aj = g
1=(+xj)
1 ,
 2 Zp is a secret of the signature authority, and xj 2 Zp is
only known to j and the signature authority.
By using the BBS scheme, the AS generates a group public
key pk0 and, for each vehicle Vj , a group member secret key
skj0 = (A
j
0; xj) where A
j
0 = g
1=(+xj)
1 . The AS also assigns
each time interval Ti a random value hi 2 G1nfg 11 g. The AS
then derives pki from pk0: the g1 element of pki equals g1 hi,
and other elements remain the same as those of pk0. Note that
there always exists a computable isomorphism  i from G2 to
G1 such that g1  hi =  i(g2). The AS also computes a value
h
1=+xj
i for each sk
j
i . During vehicle registration the AS sends
skb0 to Vb in an encrypted channel. During reputation retrieval
the AS sends h1=+xbi to Vb in plaintext if r
0
i  	. Then Vb
computes Abi = A
b
0  h1=+xbi , and forms skbi = (Abi ; xb).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed an abstraction of the scheme
in [13], and layered on top of it a privacy-aware announcement
scheme.
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